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Elderly decedent’s witnessed will,

Elderly decedent’s witnessed will,

Appellant friend sought review of the judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California) which denied probate of a will which divided decedent’s estate among appellant and respondent grandchildren, based on the conclusion that the will submitted by appellant was executed as the result of undue influence.

Elderly decedent’s witnessed will, executed two months before her death, divided her estate equally among appellant friend and respondent grandchildren. The will had been drafted by appellant. The trial court denied probate, concluding that the will was executed as a result of undue influence. Appellant contended the evidence was insufficient to support the finding of undue influence. The court held that, under the americans with disabilities act requires standard of review and resolving all conflicts and inferences in favor of the prevailing party, the evidence sufficiently supported the trial court’s determination. Great weight was given to the trial court’s observation and evaluation of witnesses. A confidential relationship was inferred by the fact that decedent reposed the necessary trust and confidence in appellant to ask him to draft her will. Based on the facts, even though they were scant, the court could not say as a matter of law that no confidential relationship existed. Undue influence was presumed because appellant in a confidential relationship actively participated in drafting the will by which he unduly profited. Appellant did not meet the burden of rebutting the presumption. Judgment was affirmed.

The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court in denying probate because the evidence on behalf of respondent grandchildren, though sketchy, was sufficient to support the presumption of undue influence and appellant friend then failed to overcome that presumption.

Defendant franchisor and plaintiff franchisee sought review of the judgment of the Superior Court of Marin County (California), which entered judgment for plaintiff on his claims for breach of contract, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, and intentional infliction of emotional distress but denied plaintiff any relief on his claim under the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.S. § 2801 et seq.

Under a franchise agreement, plaintiff franchisee could not assign without defendant franchisor’s consent. Defendant denied plaintiff’s requests to transfer the franchise. At all times during these events, the law provided that a lessor could withhold his assent to assignment arbitrarily unless the lease provided otherwise. Plaintiff filed an action for breach of contract, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and for violation of the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act (PMPA), 15 U.S.C.S. § 2801 et seq. Thereafter, the law was changed to provide that a lessor could breach a contract by withholding his consent to assignment arbitrarily. The superior court entered judgment for plaintiff on all claims but the PMPA claim. The court reversed the judgment, holding that the superior court erred in retroactively applying the new law, as defendant should not have been penalized for its inability to predict the change in the law, defendant’s reliance on the prior law was total, and Cal. Bus & Prof. Code § 21148 weighed against retroactive application because it codified the new law but denied retrospective application.

The court reversed the judgment, holding that the superior court erred in retroactively applying the new law that a lessor could not arbitrarily withhold his consent to assignment to plaintiff franchisee’s action for, inter alia, breach of contract, as defendant franchisor should not have been penalized for its inability to predict the change in the law and defendant’s reliance on the prior law was total.

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